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Canada has undertaken commitments to recognize the rights of Indigenous Peoples in
fisheries through policies and agreements, including Integrated Fishery Management
Plans, the Reconciliation Strategy, and Land Claim Agreements (LCAs). In addition
to recognizing rights, these commitments were intended to respect geographic
adjacency principles, to enhance the economic viability of Indigenous communities,
and to be reflective of community dependence on marine resources. We examined
the determinants of quota allocations in commercial fisheries involving Nunatsiavut,
Northern Labrador, the first self-governing region for the Inuit peoples in Canada.
It has been argued that current fishery allocations for Nunatsiavut Inuit have not
satisfied federal commitments to recognize Indigenous rights. Indicators that measure
equity in commercial allocations for the turbot or Greenland halibut (Reinhardtius
hippoglossoides) and northern shrimp (Pandalus borealis) fisheries were identified
and assessed. In these two cases, historical allocations continue to predominate
for allocations based upon equity or other social or economic considerations. We
illustrate equity-enhancing changes in the quota distribution under scenarios of different
levels of inequality aversion, and we make qualitative assessments of the effects
of these allocations to Nunatsiavut for socioeconomic welfare. This approach could
benefit fisheries governance in Northern Labrador, where federal commitments to
equity objectives continue to be endorsed but have not yet been integrated fully into
quota allocations.
Keywords: fisheries, allocations, equity, indigenous rights, access
Translations of the abstract in Inuttitut and Inuktitut can be found in the Supplementary Material.
INTRODUCTION
The social, cultural, ecological, and economic importance of marine ecosystems in the Arctic
remain to a large extent understudied, despite their importance to the wellbeing of Inuit
communities. In recent years, climate shifts have drawn increasing attention of scientists toward
understanding the shifting ecosystem dynamics in the Arctic and the effects of those shifts on
both inshore and offshore harvested marine resources. If coastal communities are to be resilient,
this focus has to shift to involve greater consideration of economic and social dynamics in
providing access to these marine resources. We recast some of these well-known Arctic challenges
by looking at fisheries management, including access to and allocations of commercial fisheries
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involving the Northern Labrador Inuit. In this context, access
refers to both resources and space as defined by Bennett et al.
(2018) to describe “the ability to use and benefit from available
marine resources or areas of the ocean or the coast.”
Nunatsiavut is located at the northern tip of Newfoundland
and Labrador on the east coast of Canada (Figure 1), covering
an area of about 72,520 km2 of land and inland waters,
48,690 km2 of sea (adjacent tidal waters) with 15,000 km
of coastline along the Labrador Sea (CIRNAC, 2005; Snook
et al., 2018). About 5% (2,325) of the population identifying
as Indigenous in Inuit Nunangat, the homeland of Inuit (ITK,
2019), lives in Northern Labrador, the Inuit Land Claims
Settlement Area of Nunatsiavut, according to the 2011 National
Household Survey and the 2012 Aboriginal Peoples Survey
(Statistics Canada, 2016). The Inuit living in Labrador are
a little more than 3.5% of the whole Inuit population in
Canada (2016) (ITK, 2018). Marine resource harvesting has
been a fundamental component of the subsistence economy in
Northern Labrador for many years (Brice-Bennett, 1977) as well
as of the wage-based economy with commercial harvesting and
processing operations supporting in multiple ways the coastal
communities of Nunatsiavut.
After more than 30 years of negotiations between the
Labrador Inuit Association and the federal and provincial
(Newfoundland and Labrador) governments, Labrador Inuit
voted to accept the Labrador Inuit Land Claim Agreement
(LILCA) (CIRNAC, 2005), which led to today’s self-governance
regime. This regime provides the Nunatsiavut Government
(NG) with the opportunity of deciding how natural resources
should be managed and developed. Chapter 13 of the LILCA
is the main instrument determining Inuit access rights to
marine resources, including those harvested for commercial
and subsistence purposes. It defines the “Zone” (Labrador
Inuit Settlement Area, LISA, Figure 1) and the “Waters
Adjacent to the Zone”1 and is therefore viewed as a path to
sovereignty for increased control and access to locally harvested
marine resources. The LILCA also led to the creation of the
Torngat Secretariat which is the implementation agent for
the Torngat Joint Fisheries Board (TJFB) and the Torngat
Wildlife and Plants Co-Management Board. These boards,
in line with the LILCA co-management approach to marine
resources in the region, provide recommendations for fisheries’
conservation and management. Despite the LILCA provisions
and the recommendations of the boards, fisheries management
is largely driven by federal authorities, with decision-making on
quotas and allocations being subject to ministerial discretion.
Nunatsiavut’s socioeconomic objectives associated with the
fisheries sector often are at odds with those of the federal
and the provincial governments. In addition, the current
allocation system for commercial fisheries in Nunatsiavut creates
a sense of unfairness, inequity, and marginalization among local
harvesters (Snook et al., 2018), most of whom have an Inuit
identity background.
1Canadian fisheries waters within the portions of Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Organization Divisions 2G, 2H, and 2J adjoining and lying due eastward of
the Zone.
The commercial fisheries that fall within Nunatsiavut
interests2 (Figure 1) include snow crab (Chionoecetes opilio) in
NAFO Divisions 2GHJ, northern shrimp (Pandalus borealis) in
shrimp fishing areas (SFAs) 4 and 5, turbot or greenland halibut
(Reinhardtuis hippoglossoides) in 2+3KLMNO and 0B, Arctic
char (Salvelinus alpinus) stock complexes of Nain, Okak, and
Voisey (fishing primarily occurs around Nain Bay) and Icelandic
Scallop (Chlamys islandica) which is fished intermittently in
scallop Fishing Area 1 (not depicted in Figure 1, but see DFO,
2019c, Appendix 4).
In this paper, we review the current status of the
socioeconomic benefits that commercial fisheries produce
as a result of turbot and shrimp allocations to the NG along with
management and governance issues associated with access to
commercial fisheries. We encompass equity considerations and
attempt to bring together existing knowledge on current and
past allocations, identify current and past successes and failures
connected to the distribution of benefits among adjacent users,
and suggest ways that could help sustain long-lived commercial
fisheries in Nunatsiavut. Specifically, we examine socioeconomic
welfare implications of shifts in allocations using different
allocation scenarios under which the spirit and intent of the
LILCA could be more fully realized. Although we recognize
the complexity of decision-making for allocations, we propose
the use of economic tools that can help increase transparency,
which we expect may contribute toward alleviating conflicts on
resource access caused by top-down decision-making processes.
Our approach contributes to the knowledge base needed for
understanding how realigning Nunatsiavut’s fisheries allocations
with the LILCA and other federal mandates (e.g., adjacency
principle and Reconciliation Strategy) could help deliver
increased socioeconomic benefits to Labrador Inuit and support
reconciliation and self-determination across Inuit Nunangat
and other Indigenous groups who are in the process of
negotiating Land Claim Agreements (LCAs) (e.g., Inuit in
Southern Labrador). Almost 15 years after the LILCA, it is
both timely and important to acquire a better understanding of
the socioeconomic outcomes of fisheries management and draw
lessons for monitoring progress and evaluating whether social
and economic goals are being met.
FISHERIES GOVERNANCE AND
ALLOCATIONS IN NUNATSIAVUT
Canada’s Commitments to Indigenous
Rights in Fisheries
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) and the Canadian Coast
Guard, as a part of the Reconciliation Strategy (DFO, 2019e) have
taken a long-term commitment to “recognize and implement
2The interests of Nunatsiavut regionally include: Communal and competitive,
special and enterprise allocations as well as licenses to the Nunatsiavut
Government, individuals from the region, the Torngat Fish Producers Cooperative
(Torngat Co-op) and the Nunatsiavut Group of Companies (NGC) who have
obtained the licenses independently (including their subsidiaries such as Pikalujak
Fisheries Ltd or coalitions such as the Northern Coalition share to which the
Torngat Co-op and the NGC are part of).
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FIGURE 1 | Nunatsiavut, commercial fisheries, and management areas.
Indigenous and treaty rights related to fisheries” in line with:
(a) section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (Department of
Justice, 2017); (b) the United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples (United Nations, 2007; CIRNAC, 2016);
(c) the Voluntary Guidelines on the responsible governance of
tenure of land, fisheries and forests in the context of national
food security (FAO, 2012); and (d) the Principles Respecting
the Government of Canada’s Relationship with Indigenous
Peoples (Department of Justice., 2018). While the Reconciliation
strategy is a relatively new initiative, since 2005, the LILCA has
defined adjacency and provided the NG with a constitutional
right to be included in consultations for fisheries management
(CIRNAC, 2005, 13.11.1). The exclusion of the TJFB from some
consultations and the subsequent changes in considerations
regarding adjacency, access to fish stocks and fisheries
management have previously created tensions between the
TJFB and the Ministry of Fisheries and Oceans (see for example
the case for northern shrimp in Torngat Wildlife Plants and
Torngat Wildlife Plants and Fisheries Secretariat [TWPFS], 2017).
Besides the Reconciliation Strategy, DFO has also long been
committing through the Integrated Fisheries Management Plans
(IFMPs), the primary mechanism for fisheries management
in Canada, to “provide fair access and equitable sharing of
the resource” and “promote the continued development of a
commercially viable and self-sustaining fishery.” Both long-term
and short-term objectives of benefits to stakeholders emphasize
access and equitable sharing of the resource, acknowledging and
respecting economic viability and dependence, adjacency and
transparent sharing principles and at the same time promoting
the co-management of marine resources. The need to fulfill
obligations under LCAs and respecting Aboriginal rights to fish
is at the forefront of IFMPs (e.g., see DFO, 2018, 2019d). It is
also worth noting that certification standards do not pay close
attention to such issues when evaluating fisheries management.
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The Marine Stewardship Council for example, in evaluating the
management of Greenland halibut, finds the existence of LCAs a
sufficient form of acknowledgment and respect for the rights of
people dependent on fishing for food and livelihood (MSC, 2019,
p. 127, 3.7 and PI 3.1.1).
The recent bill, C-68, which amends the Fisheries Act and
other laws primarily for the protection of fish and fish habitats,
explicitly requires the Minister to consider the potential adverse
effects that decisions may have on Indigenous rights and consider
Indigenous Knowledge (IK) in decision-making (Parliament of
Canada, 2019). Nevertheless, it still does not adequately address
adjacency, which is inherent in Indigenous rights and determines
much of the benefits from allocations and resource access. This
remains an issue despite calls from regional stakeholders to
consider addressing the highly debated and controversial issue of
access and allocation (Barker, 2018).
In addition to the commitments described earlier, Canada’s
support in the development of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea was driven primarily by the needs of
coastal communities which include sovereignty claims for the
oceans, with a particular focus in the Arctic (Mathias et al.,
2008; Bennett et al., 2018). Other fisheries policies, such as the
New Access Framework (DFO, 2002) are also meant to support
adjacency, historic dependence and economic viability, but their
implementation has had limited success in Nunatsiavut. The
access of some Indigenous communities in Atlantic Canada has
benefitted from the R. v. Marshall court decision, which sets a
precedent for increased access of other Indigenous communities
in the region (Bennett et al., 2018). In recent years there have been
increasing efforts to promote inclusion of Indigenous Peoples in
decision-making in support of increased access and allocation
(Denny and Fanning, 2016a,b; Bennett et al., 2018).
From an institutional standpoint, notwithstanding all the
improvements in gaining independence for natural resource
management in Nunatsiavut through the LILCA, sovereignty
over fisheries management lags behind. Despite the dynamic and
ambitious goals of the TJFB in the first years of its establishment,
as well as its efforts to foster both Western Science and IK in
decision-making, its effectiveness in ensuring a fair allocation of
marine resources to Nunatsiavut has been limited. Snook et al.
(2018) attribute this, in part, to the “newness” of the Board
and Nunatsiavut itself as a self-governance region (since 2005)
as well as to the uncertainties in establishing relationships with
provincial and federal bodies.
Access and Fisheries Management in
Nunatsiavut
On a yearly basis, DFO provides allocations to the NG which
in turn sub-allocates them to land-claim beneficiaries, under the
LILCA provisions (Coombs et al., 2011; NG, n.d.). Commercial
fisheries are managed through communal licenses, under which
individuals are designated to fish the quota attached to these
licenses (Department of Justice, 2009). Designates need to fulfill
certain eligibility criteria pertaining to their prior participation in
the commercial fishery and their plans for long-term engagement
in the fishery (NG, n.d.). In the interest of best utilizing its
quotas, the NG prioritizes allocations to those designates with a
history of performance and commitment in fisheries, who own a
registered operational vessel suitable to partake in the fishery or
can provide evidence for their intention to go into a lease or co-
op arrangement (see more details on the priority criteria in NG,
n.d.). Allocations thus far have been primarily provided to a small
number of fishers with a continuous interest for participation and
for pursuing a livelihood from the fishery.
The communal management comes with strengths and
limitations. It is meant to ensure that property rights for
fisheries stay within the communities, which may help avoid
some of the negative effects of rights-based management
systems, such as those of Individual Transferable Quotas
(ITQs). ITQs have been criticized for impacting wellbeing
in small fishing communities by inducing concentration of
fishing rights in few hands, often outside the communities,
inequitable allocations, as well as limited access and distribution
of benefits from the fisheries across rightsholders (Eythórsson,
2000; Bromley, 2009; Carothers, 2011; Carothers and Chambers,
2012; Richmond, 2013). The communal management system also
helps prevent vertical integration, including in processing, which
may also lead to the concentration of economic benefits. Despite
these perceived strengths, communal management provides
limited financial independence to local fishers for professional
development. Third party institutions are often unwilling to
finance fishers with no independently owned licenses and quotas
since they entail a higher risk. This limits registers of new
fishers, prevents existing fishers from acquiring new vessels or
equipment, and leads to a sense of unfairness when compared
to the potential for capacity development of fishers elsewhere
accessing the same fish stocks (Torngat Wildlife Plants and
Torngat Wildlife Plants and Fisheries Secretariat [TWPFS], 2018,
2019).
At the same time, the communal way of managing fisheries is
questionable from both an efficiency and an equity standpoint.
Transferability is often seen as a means that helps achieve
efficiency and minimize overcapacity (Hannesson, 2004; Squires
et al., 2010; Sumaila, 2010). Given that, in the absence of
locally owned vessels, many beneficiaries in Nunatsiavut go into
lease arrangements with vessel owners, overcapacity does not
seem to be a problem at a regional scale; note though that
overcapacity triggered by significant cuts in shrimp quotas to
southern Newfoundland and Labrador inshore fishers (Foley
et al., 2019) may expand over to Nunatsiavut as they increasingly
go into lease arrangements. The efficiency of the communal
management system, however, in terms of maximizing rents
has not been studied. Efficiency considerations do not explicitly
inform allocation decisions at a federal level and therefore it is
hard to evaluate trade-offs between equity and efficiency and
address Nunatsiavut’s claims for unfair allocations. It is possible
that an optimal combination of tradable and non-tradable quotas
provides more flexibility and addresses both equity and efficiency
concerns, but this has not been examined either. One may
hypothesize for example, that the current allocation may look
similar to today’s allocation under a tradable quota system minus
the income that the NG would get from selling its shares. In
other words, if the NG had access to all the quota for stocks
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adjacent to their lands, as the TJFB has been advising, they could
potentially choose to sell almost all of it resulting in an ex post
allocation very similar to today’s allocation, assuming that this is
the efficient outcome.
So while communal fisheries management may have some
benefits, it is not clear whether it empowers local fishers
and allows them to benefit fully from fisheries socially and
economically. The NG is currently in the process of revising its
fisheries policy to address these concerns, alleviate the difficulties
to entry, and assess and capture any socioeconomic benefits
foregone due to the communal way of managing fisheries.
The current fisheries access arrangements in Nunatsiavut,
along with key fishing areas and management divisions, are
illustrated in Figure 2. Nunatsiavut enjoys exclusive access
to snow crab in 2H and 2J and to all Arctic char stocks
in the region. In what follows, we focus on the turbot and
northern shrimp fisheries to which Nunatsiavut has limited
access and for which the TJFB has expressed concerns on
access equity. We examine issues associated with access rights
of the NG, despite recognizing that there exist additional
access avenues to fisheries from regional stakeholders. We
focus on access to the NG because it has been granted
through the LILCA and is directly associated with the Federal
Government’s reconciliation plans with Northern Labrador Inuit.
Access to additional allocations to regional stakeholders has
been acquired through different means, such as the purchase
of licenses.
A brief overview of access that falls within the Nunatsiavut
interests, as depicted in Figure 2, is given below: Access to turbot
stocks in area 0B is through special, enterprise and competitive
allocations while access to 2+3(K)LMNO is through two different
avenues: (a) the communal allocation to the NG (3.38% of the
Canadian TAC) and (b) 3 groundfish licenses in the competitive
fishery. The primary fishing areas for northern shrimp within
(and adjacent to) the LISA are SFAs 4 and 5, where access is
limited to about 10 and 9.9%, respectively. Similar to the turbot,
broader interests within the region of Nunatsiavut include access
to SFA 6 (waters adjacent to the “zone”) and through offshore
licenses (1.5 license) that provide quotas to SFAs 0, 1, and 4–7.
In the sections that follow, we discuss different approaches
to distributional equity and relevant metrics. DFO does not
provide a clear definition of “equity” and we therefore see value
in identifying relevant tools for its measurement. From a social
planner’s standpoint, the priority should be to manage the fishery
for maximizing rents and then consider wealth distribution
mechanisms to e.g., meet societal goals, such as equity. When
rents are dissipated because of poor management, this is likely
to hurt all rightsholders and exacerbate the equity problem.
In line with this, previous studies on inter-sectoral allocations,
addressing allocation disputes between the recreational and
commercial sector, conclude that reallocation should not be
a first-order concern (Abbott, 2015). While recognizing the
importance of this from a larger-picture perspective and the
needs for reforms to fisheries as a whole, contrasting views
on allocations between different fleet sectors still need to be
reconciled to alleviate current controversies and contribute to the
reconciliation agenda. We suggest that the way to do this is by
shedding light on economic and equity considerations that factor




Perceptions and definitions of equity differ among scholars,
practitioners, managers, and resource users. Armstrong and
Clark (1997) for example consider three dimensions of
egalitarianism within a utilitarian spectrum that ensures
maximum profit, so that no reallocation can increase total profits.
These dimensions include an equal access management, an equal
resource management (equal harvests among all), and an equal
average product (equal average harvest relative to fishing effort).
It is clear that, in the absence of a clear definition, equity is
susceptible to different interpretations.
Just as perceptions and definitions differ, so do ways of
measuring inequalities, such as income inequalities. Examples
of most commonly used inequality measurement frameworks
include the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient, generalized
entropy measures (Theil index), the Atkinson index and the
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), the Robin Hood (or Hoover
or Pietra) index, ratios such as the decile dispersion, the Palma
and the 20/20 ratio (De Maio, 2007; Afonso et al., 2015). It is
reasonable to expect that some of these measures may be highly
correlated (Kawachi and Kennedy, 1997). However, there are
empirical studies finding that the choice of inequality metric does
lead to a noticeable difference. Weich et al. (2002), for example,
find important differences in the Gini and General Entropy
metrics for the U.K. which were attributed to how sensitive they
were to income differences among people at the top or bottom
of the income distribution. Using multiple indicators is therefore
highly recommended within different domestic and international
policy frameworks (Afonso et al., 2015) to allow for income
differences at different parts of the distribution to be reflected
(Wen et al., 2003; De Maio, 2007).
Despite the many ways in which income inequality may
influence decisions on resource allocation, not all of them are
meaningful in a fisheries context or in many cases the data to
support the development of these metrics are absent. Much of the
fisheries economics literature on fairness, distributional effects,
and equity, focuses on distributional issues related to the impacts
of alternative management schemes or changes in the existing
ones as well as trade-offs between efficiency and equity (Dupont
and Phipps, 1991; Armstrong and Clark, 1997). These trade-offs
have been examined in different spatial management contexts
(e.g., Marine Protected Areas) and with the use of a variety
of economic tools (e.g., game theory) (Sumaila and Armstrong,
2006). Rights-based fisheries management such as ITQs and their
distributional effects have attracted, for a long time now, the
most attention in this literature (Matthiasson, 1992; Guyader
and Thebaud, 2001). Fewer studies have addressed equity of
access using income inequality metrics, but again those that do,
emphasize testing the effects of quota transferability (Adelaja
et al., 1998; Connor, 2000; Hamon et al., 2009).
Frontiers in Marine Science | www.frontiersin.org 5 February 2021 | Volume 8 | Article 590213
fmars-08-590213 February 18, 2021 Time: 12:9 # 6
Kourantidou et al. Equitable Allocations in Northern Fisheries
FIGURE 2 | Access and allocation to commercial fisheries in Nunatsiavut.
If marginal costs of production are available, the most
straightforward way to examine concentration is to compare
prices for estimating the degree of monopoly power (Connor,
2000). The Concentration ratio can been used as the proportion
of the market (or quota) share that certain firms hold (Adelaja
et al., 1998; Connor, 2000). Other straightforward examples that
have been used to measure concentration include the number and
% of owners with 95% share, the % share controlled by the top 5%
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of owners and the number of owners with less than minimum
holdings for the class (Connor, 2000). Other commonly used
inequality metrics that measure market concentration and
inequality resulting from implementation of ITQs include the
Gini Index (GI) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
(Adelaja et al., 1998; Connor, 2000; Hamon et al., 2009).
The GI along with the Lorenz curve are among the most
popular metrics of income inequality with multiple applications
in fisheries (Gini, 1921). The GI framework is appealing and easy
to use for communicating policies through a single summary
statistic that measures the ratio of the area between a Lorenz
curve and a 45-degree line of income equality to the total area
under this line. It ranges from 0 to 1 reflecting the range from
a perfectly equal (egalitarian) to a perfectly unequal distribution
of income or property rights that generate income. With higher
levels of inequality, the GI increases and the Lorenz curve starts
deviating from the equality line. Two common shortcomings
discussed in the literature are that (a) despite different patterns
of income distribution, GI values may remain similar and (b)
it is overly sensitive to inequalities in the middle of the income
distribution (usually the mean) which makes it inappropriate
for cases where inequalities on the top or the bottom of the
distribution matter. Indexes such as the Atkinson and Theil,
which are briefly discussed below, are more suitable for attaching
more weight to the tails of a distribution.
In a fishery context, since the GI does not account for the
number of participants, it has been criticized for lagging behind
in revealing inequities from comparisons among participants that
may have the same quota shares. As Connor (2000) explains,
it treats two firms with 50% quota each and 100 firms with
1% quota in the same way. The HHI accounts for both the
number of participants and inequality in quota shares, weighing
the larger firms quadratically. It is expressed through the sum
of the squared proportionate shares of all participants in the
fishery, and similar to the GI ranges from 0 to 1. An increased
number of fishers indicates decreased concentration and results
in a decreased HHI index.
Inequality within and between subgroups of vessels or fishers
has attracted less attention overall (Armstrong and Clark, 1997)
and particularly in the literature that uses inequality metrics
(Bellanger et al., 2016). General Entropy (GE) measures can
address the limitation of the GI framework to distinguish between
different distribution curves, through their decomposability
properties. GE may be measured either through the “Theil′s L”
(referred to as Theil) and “Theil’s T” or Mean Log Deviation
(MLD), depending on the sensitivity parameter chosen which
varies in the weight given to inequalities in differing parts of
the income distribution (Theil, 1967; De Maio, 2007). Lower
values indicate more sensitivity to changes in the lower tail of
the distribution and higher values indicate the opposite. When
this parameter is 0 then the index is called Theil′s L or Theil
and when 1, it is the MLD. The Theil index is estimated as the
weighted average of inequality among subgroups and measures
the entropic distance between the observed and perfect equality
distribution (Bellanger et al., 2016). It has been used at a
regional scale for decomposing within and between components
of different features of a fishery such as fishing gear, vessel length,
distance from fishing grounds and production (Bellanger et al.,
2016) as well as at a global scale to distinguish the between
and within inequality attributed to biological and technological
conditions, respectively (Gutiérrez and Inguanzo, 2019). In other
words, the Theil index can answer the question of how much
of the observed inequality can be explained by differences
between fishing areas (e.g., species diversity, climate, nutrients,
and other productivity factors) and how much by differences
between different fishing actors in these areas (e.g., technological
features of the fleet such as gear length, power, and distance)
(Gutiérrez and Inguanzo, 2019).
The Atkinson (1970) index (AI) addresses disparities by
applying weights to society’s aversion to inequality. It utilizes
a social inequality aversion parameter that ranges from 0 to
infinity, reflecting indifference to the nature of the distribution
or concerns for the income of the poorest group. Similar to
the GI, the AI ranges from 0 for an egalitarian distribution to
1 for maximum inequality, with higher values of the aversion
parameter making the index more sensitive to inequalities at
the bottom of the distribution (De Maio, 2007). It has been
used in a fishery context, through scenarios for different levels
of inequality aversion, primarily to reflect equity in distribution
of fisheries resources but also to spatially demonstrate the
impact of competing ocean uses (Hoagland et al., 2015;
Gutiérrez and Inguanzo, 2019). One can interpret the AI as the
percentage of total income that would have to be sacrificed to
achieve equally distributed incomes (see more details in section
“Inequality Aversion”).
Intra-Country Distributional Equity:
Allocations to Indigenous Groups
The role of social justice and equity in resource management and
conservation is increasingly being recognized in the Indigenous
literature (Artelle et al., 2019). Despite the attention equity has
attracted, particularly within resource governance frameworks, it
is still largely a concept that remains elusive and is tied primarily
to political arguments that relate to past wrongdoings of central
governments and the ongoing reconciliation process. Decision-
makers though face pressures from multiple stakeholders with
interests in accessing natural resources which in theory should
force them to be transparent about the rationale that directs
their allocation decisions and the underlying socioeconomic
impacts of those.
The income disparities among Indigenous and non-
Indigenous groups have received attention from both researchers
and governments since the 1990s [see for example Patrinos
and Sakellariou (1992); De Silva (1999), Duhaime and Édouard
(2015), and other references in Maxim et al. (2001)]. Despite
the evidence for the economic disadvantage that Indigenous
communities may face, whether this factors into resource
allocation decisions remains ambiguous. Some view the
communal allocations or newly granted access rights to
Indigenous groups as a means of addressing the income
disparities. Most allocations or access rights across Inuit
Nunangat though are largely the outcome of negotiation
processes in Land Claim Agreements in expectation of
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anticipated negative impacts from non-renewable resource
extraction. They do not represent compensatory allocations
for the current economic disadvantage of those communities
and are not grounded on any economic or distributional equity
considerations. There is anecdotal evidence though that non-
Indigenous fishers feel disadvantaged since it is costly for them to
acquire a license and enter the fishery, unlike Indigenous fishers
who do not face such costs when fishing under the communal
license. As many fisheries in Canada are fully subscribed,
granting access for new Indigenous entrants is wrought with
conflict (Withers, 2018; NCC, 2019).
In what follows we discuss the current distribution of quotas
for the turbot and northern shrimp fisheries among different
stakeholder groups in order to characterize what distributional
equity may look like. This type of equity analysis would normally
require knowing the number of fishers and households connected
to these fishers who benefit from the allocation to each group.
In the absence of this information though and the lack of any
relevant considerations justifying current allocations, we first
described what an equal allocation, in the sense of a uniform
distribution of quotas, would look like among the different
stakeholder groups in each fishery. We do recognize though
that it may not be the intention of the management authority
(DFO in this case), to distribute quotas in an equal or uniform
manner across stakeholder groups. Nevertheless, we see value in
illustrating the way of thinking for such an approach given the
Government’s commitments described in the previous section,
for “equitable” sharing of the resource, which are loosely defined
in fisheries management plans.
In addition to this limitation of using the stakeholder groups
to reflect distributional equity, another caveat of this approach
is that it does not account for heterogeneity among these
groups and their capacity to access the resource. This becomes
important, especially for the turbot fishery for which allocations
are shared among different fleet sectors (Supplementary
Tables 1, 2). Although considerations regarding access capacity
may factor in DFO’s decision-making for allocations, this is not
done in an explicit or transparent enough manner.
We assume that all stakeholder groups face identical prices,
and we therefore use the quota allocations to each stakeholder
group (in tons) to estimate distributional equity metrics. This is
a key simplifying assumption which allows us to ignore for the
purposes of this exercise any disparities in income generated from
the fisheries to the different stakeholder groups. In reality though,
some fishers may be getting a lower price than others depending
on their distance to markets. Most fishers in the province, with
the exception of Nunatsiavut fishers, are members of the Fish
Food and Allied Workers Union (FFAW) that determines prices.
However, the single processor in Nunatsiavut, the Torngat Fish
Producers Co-Operative (Co-Op), offers prices similar to those
offered by the FFAW.
Turbot Allocation and Management
For the turbot fishery we focus on quota allocations from
areas 2+3K and 3LMNO, to which the NG gets 3.38% of
the total Canadian TAC through its communal allocation
(Supplementary Tables 1, 2). For the purposes of this exercise
we ignore non-communal access3 to turbot that falls within
the broader interests of Nunatsiavut. This includes for example
the special, enterprise or competitive allocations in area 0B
held by the Torngat Co-Op and the Nunatsiavut Group of
companies (NGC). Additionally, we focus on the allocations
within Canada, ignoring allocations to other NAFO members and
the French quota.
Most of today’s fishing activity is concentrated in the southern
part of 3L, followed by areas 3K and 2J; the activity in 2H
(also adjacent to northern Labrador and within the LISA) is
quite small (MSC, 2019). The changes in turbot allocations
over the past few years have been very minimal in both areas
2+3K and 3LMNO which results in similar Lorenz curves
and consequent Gini coefficients (see turbot allocations for the
past 7 years in Supplementary Tables 1, 2 and Lorenz curves
for 2019 in Figures 1, 2). The Supplementary Table 5 shows
the General Entropy (GE) index metrics estimated for 2019
collectively in areas 2+3K and 3LMNO for varying degrees of
weights to distances between allocations as explained in section
“Distributional Equity Metrics” Distributional equity metrics
(Theil’s T/GE for a = 1, Theil’s L/Mean Log Deviation/GE for a = 0
and GE for a = 2).
The Lorenz curves show how uniformly allocations are
distributed across stakeholder groups, with the 45 degree line
representing the scenario of all groups receiving exactly the same
quota. The Gini coefficients of ∼ 0.62 and 0.59, for areas 2+3K
and 3LMNO, respectively, indicate that quotas are distributed
across stakeholder groups in the two areas in a fairly similar
manner, with a high degree of concentration for both of them.
The GE index metrics, collectively for 2+3K and 3LMNO, also
reveal a relatively high degree of concentration in certain groups.
This approach is oversimplified in that it does not account for the
number of fishers or vessels in each stakeholder group or their
incomes from other sources. In the absence of a clear definition
of distributional equity, this metric is a starting point for the logic
to be followed in the future. Such metrics should be evaluated
considering information about individual vessel owners and their
access to quotas.
The appropriate metric to use ultimately depends on DFO’s
definition of distributional equity. If equity concerns include
how fairly income from fisheries (or allocations) is distributed
among the “middle” stakeholder groups, then Gini could make
an appropriate indicator. It is important to note though the
limitation of the GI in capturing inequality at the tails of
the allocation distribution, given its sensitivity to the middle
of the distribution. At the same time though the GI is not
informative regarding where one may find the inequality (e.g.,
in the middle categories or also in the lower end of the
distribution among the “poorest” ones), and it has been criticized
for being insensitive to levels of high inequality. However, recent
developments indicate that the criticisms of the GI being too
3The NG has access to its quota either through its allocation or through the
competitive allocation. For its allocation, the NG may designate multiple fixed
gear inshore vessels to harvest its allocation simultaneously or may request DFO’s
authorization for eligible fixed gear license holders to harvest it. The competitive
allocation is in the competitive fixed gear fishery and falls under NG’s three
communal commercial enterprises.
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sensitive in the middle of the distribution could be somewhat
inaccurate. In support of this argument Gastwirth (2017) shows
that when incremental transfers of income happen between
upper to low income categories, those have a larger weight
compared to transfers among incomes in the middle of the
distribution and the effects on the GI tend to be larger in this
case. This would deserve more research attention in the context
of quota re-allocation.
Other indices with useful properties include the Theil index
which can decompose “within” and “between-group” inequality
(Gutiérrez and Inguanzo, 2019) to provide an idea of how
much of the inequality can be explained by differences among
stakeholders in the fishery. For differently sized groups though,
such as those in the turbot fishery, the Theil index may not
be as helpful for direct comparisons, especially across time and
space. Some recent applications provide good examples of how
the Theil index can be used to better understand how inequalities
within fleet sectors contribute to total inequality, as well as
decompose inequality by vessel characteristics and fishing areas
(Bellanger et al., 2016).
The use of appropriate metrics may lead to new considerations
regarding allocations decisions. Besides the communal quotas
allocated to Nunatsiavut, the rest of the fleet sectors access the
fishery through enterprise allocations, ITQs, and competitive
quotas. According to sources referenced in MSC (2019), a single
stakeholder has 60% of the offshore quota in the form of
an enterprise allocation and has gained access through quota
transfers to about 80% of the total offshore quota. The inshore
and 2+3K and 3L < 65′ fixed gear fisheries are competitive
with an access to a small quota (∼ 1,100 t in 2018). Every year,
following an open call by DFO, fishers interested in participating
in the 2+3K or 3LMNO fisheries are provided with permits for
a certain quota to be fished within a specific period of the fishing
season. In the case of either limited or excessive interest at the
initial stage, DFO disseminates those permits based on a draw,
which is perceived as a way of providing “equal” opportunities to
all interested eligible fishers (MSC, 2019).
Last, the income dependence of participants on the fishery
should be tracked consistently over time and be factored into
decisions on allocations in a more explicit manner. DFO has
tracked the dependency of harvesters on groundfish, reporting
on these numbers occasionally, but there is limited evidence
that a measure of dependency is taken into consideration when
allocating quotas across different groups or when changes in the
TAC occur. In 2017 the dependency of 2+3KLMNO groundfish
harvesters operating < 65′ vessels (1,622 active) was primarily for
crab (77%), cod (7%), turbot (5%), shrimp (5%), and other species
(6%) (DFO, 2019b). The previous IFMP for 2+3KL (2013),
provides the spectrum of income dependency on groundfish in
2012 for active harvesters; 15.4% of the active harvesters (1,848
in total) were completely dependent on groundfish for their
fishing earnings (with annual earnings of less than $5,000). For
the vast majority though (66.4%) the income dependency was
less than 10% (annual earnings for those with low dependency
$260,000). Where geographically disparate groups of harvesters
have access to different fishing grounds or groundfish fisheries,
and in the absence of quota transferability mechanisms for all
groups, it becomes important to have fishers’ dependency factor
into allocation decisions.
Shrimp Allocation and Management
For the northern shrimp fishery, we focus on quota allocations
in SFA 4 and 5, to which the NG currently gets 10 and
9.9%, respectively through its communal commercial licenses
(Supplementary Tables 3, 4)4. Similar to the turbot fishery,
we ignore for the purposes of this exercise access that falls
within the broader interests of Nunatsiavut which includes
access to the portion of SFA 6 within waters adjacent to the
Zone and access through offshore licenses to 0, 1, and 4–7.
Additionally, we exclude, for SFAs 4 and 5, the scientific/offshore
competitive quota which was discontinued after the 2015/16
season. Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients for the 2019/20
allocation shares are shown in Supplementary Figures 3, 4. The
same limitations described earlier for the turbot fishery, also
apply in the Lorenz framework for the shrimp. General Entropy
(GE) index metrics for 2019, estimated collectively for SFA 4
and 5 and for varying degrees of weights to distances between
allocations, are shown in Supplementary Table 5. The degree
of concentration of allocations to certain groups is relatively
high for the northern shrimp fishery but slightly less than the
concentration in the turbot fishery.
The northern shrimp is perceived as the most valuable
fishery in Nunatsiavut, however, its economic impact has not
been assessed and neither has its contribution to regional
development (Foley et al., 2017). Different types of problems
have been identified in the allocation of rights in the Nunatsiavut
region. A good example is found in one of the audits for
the implementation of the LILCA (OAG, 2015). The audit
found that the interpretation of the obligation to provide the
NG with commercial fishing access has been unclear. Up until
2015, access to the fishery was based on the Last In, First Out
(LIFO) policy which determined how reductions (primarily) in
the TAC would be shared among license holders. The LIFO
policy has previously created large uncertainties regarding the
prospects for future access of the NG to the fishery (e.g., quota
reductions in SFA 5). LIFO was replaced in 2015 by a proportional
sharing agreement (of changes in TAC) that allows for increased
predictability in allocations and that DFO (2018) characterizes an
“equitable” sharing.
The long-term objectives of the fishery with respect to benefits
to stakeholders and Indigenous groups, as described in the IFMP
(DFO, 2018, p. 30) include “fair access and equitable sharing.”
Similar to the case of the turbot fishery, fairness and equity are
loosely defined. The short term strategy for guiding allocations
when TAC changes happen is to use percent shares for SFAs 4,
5, and 6. For the Western and Eastern Assessment Zones (WAZ,
EAZ), however, decisions are made on a case by case basis, taking
into consideration LCA obligations (see also DFO, 2018, p. 46
for Land Claim restrictions that apply to the Nunavut Settlement
Area and the Nunavik Marine Region only). Nunatsiavut is
therefore treated differently compared to other land claim regions
4For the 2019/20 the shares are 8.62% (935 t) and 9.9% (2,188 t) for SFA 4 and 5,
respectively, according to data provided by the Torngat Secretariat.
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(DFO, 2018, p. 30). In recent years there have been some changes
in shrimp allocations to the NG which resulted for SFA 4 in
an increase of 2.5% in 2016/17, an additional increase of 4.4%
in 2017/18 and for SFA 5 in an increase of 4.5% in 2016/17.
The increase was the result of the Minister’s decision to modify
the NG’s percent shares, something which would not have been
possible in areas further north where allocations are made on a
case by case basis (DFO, 2018). The TJFB (2017a) though points
out that these increases were much lower compared to those
received by Nunavut and Nunavik with the 15% TAC increase
of 2016 in the EAZ. Additionally, since 2013, 1,500–1,700 t
from SFA 4 are being allocated to northern shrimp Research
Foundation to fund science in the EAZ and WAZ. This is not seen
through a positive lens by TJFB that finds this allocation unfair,
especially in light of the TAC increases for Nunavut and Nunavik
users (TJFB, 2017a).
Since 1979, there have been Nunatsiavut interests in the
northern shrimp fishery through 3 offshore shrimp licenses
(Foley et al., 2017). These licenses were partly a result of advocacy
on behalf of what is today the FFAW, on the grounds of adjacency
and the need for access to new resources following the cod
collapse in the late 1960s (Foley and Mather, 2016; Foley et al.,
2017). Foley et al. (2019) suggest that these licenses should be
seen in the context of Inuit political mobilization in response
to colonial and post-colonial resource extraction activities in
the region. They also note that when the licenses were granted
to Nunatsiavut fishing interests, there was significant effort
into ensuring that the Northern Labrador communities would
be the ones to benefit from those and relevant measures and
mechanisms were suggested to serve this purpose. Nunatsiavut
interests therefore benefitted significantly at the time from
those shrimp allocations (Foley et al., 2019). More detailed
information on local processes attached to indigenous rights
and local control of resources that shaped allocations starting
from the 1970s can be found in Foley et al. (2017, 2019). A key
point of controversy with respect to allocations is that broader
Nunatsiavut interests with access to shrimp quotas through non-
communal licenses are seen by federal management authorities as
supplementing the NG’s access, something that the NG disagrees
with (Foley et al., 2017).
Today’s designate program in the shrimp fishery, started off
in 1997 when DFO provided a 510 t allocation to the Labrador
Inuit Association (LIA, today’s NG) in SFA 5 for inshore fishers
in Nunatsiavut. Over the first years, this quota was caught by
offshore partners in exchange for a royalty to the NG but today
it is managed as a communal quota. In the early 2000s the
LIA developed a “beneficiary designate” program that allowed
those LILCA registered beneficiaries in the inshore fishery to
be allocated a portion of LIA’s special allocation (essentially the
communal license) (Foley et al., 2017). For a number of years,
despite the shrimp quotas that the NG has made available to local
fishers, most of it was transferred to offshore vessels (Coombs
et al., 2010). Although the number of inshore fishers has initially
been lower than expected, today most of the NG’s allocations
are harvested by local designates (97–98% of quota in 2016) and
the rest of the quotas are transferred to the offshore fleet for
royalties (TJFB, 2017a).
The NG has the flexibility to convert special allocation quota
into a communal license for designating beneficiaries to access
the shrimp under this license. While the communal license allows
for only a few designated fishers (maximum 14, DFO, 2019a), in
order to boost employment, beneficiaries are required to hire at
least one additional beneficiary on board. Employing two or more
may increase their quota (Foley et al., 2017). While successful
in boosting employment there is some controversy regarding
the limitations that the communal license management puts for
local vessel ownership and support from financial institutions.
The NG faces a trade-off between distributing smaller quotas to
many beneficiaries vs. higher quotas to a few of them which may
allow for more security and growth to those few. This trade-
off is the main driver behind seeking additional quotas on an
ongoing basis (Foley et al., 2017). Additionally, the TJFB has
been making recommendations since 2010 to the Minister of
Fisheries for increased allocations in SFAs 4 and 5, to align with
the LILCA (CIRNAC, 2005).
Due to the lack of local processing capacity, all shrimp
caught by Nunatsiavut designates is landed in Charlottetown,
NL in exchange for a royalty paid to the NG per pound of
shrimp landed. The royalties contribute to the NG’s “Commercial
Fisheries Fund,” which among other reasons, has been set up
to build capacity for potential additional access to fisheries in
the future. Although there have been no studies examining
whether processing the shrimp outside Nunatsiavut makes more
economic sense for regionally produced socioeconomic welfare
compared to the royalties paid to the Fund, it has been suggested
that additional shrimp allocations could enable processing in
Nunatsiavut (Foley et al., 2017). Previous efforts though by the
Torngat Co-op to acquire a shrimp processing license and operate
locally, have not been approved by the provincial government.
EFFECTS OF ALLOCATION CHANGES
ON SOCIOECONOMIC WELFARE
The arguments of the NG for increased turbot allocations in
NAFO Sub-Divisions 2+3KLMNO are primarily relying on the
principle of adjacency. Unlike other Indigenous groups, such as
in Nunavut and Nunavik, Nunatsiavut Inuit are not the primary
beneficiaries of their adjacent marine resources.
The TJFB has been advising for several years now for an
increased turbot allocation of 650 t or the equivalent of 12.1%
of the Canadian quota (TJFB, 2017b). The interdependencies
between the communal and competitive fisheries strengthen the
NG’s argument for an increased communal allocation that will
allow for more investments and risk diversification. Additionally,
the TJFB in advising for higher communal allocations has
brought forward the potential or expected (by DFO) elimination
of the quota/season split between June/August that has been key
in allowing for the NG’s participation in the (August) competitive
portion of the fishery (TJFB, 2017b). In the most recent call to the
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to address the “inequity,” the
TJFB (2019) argued for allocating the increase in the Canadian
quota from 2019 to 2020 (from 16,521 to 16,926 t) exclusively
to Nunatsiavut. Specifically they argued that the benefits to
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Nunatsiavut from this 145 t increase would be significantly higher
compared to a proportional sharing among all stakeholders and
would better serve the commitments and strategies of Canada’s
reconciliation agenda (TJFB, 2019). Similar to the efforts for
turbot, the TJFB has been recommending an increased allocation
to the NG for northern shrimp in SFAs 4 and 5 of minimum
11%, either through an increase in commercial fishing licenses
in waters adjacent to the zone or by other means (TJFB, 2017a).
Economic analysis has generally been absent, resulting in
fisheries resources being allocated based on unclear criteria and
processes. Despite relevant policy objectives in place at the
federal level, allocation processes remain vague and decisions
are not currently assessed against these objectives or criteria.
We therefore see value in looking at these arguments through
an economic lens and specifically in examining the economic
effects of changes in allocations. In doing that, we encompass
equity considerations which are part of the federal government’s
mandates and therefore at the forefront of the discourse for
changes in allocations. Although, missing data and knowledge
gaps limit our ability to assess with accuracy the economic
impact of changes, we argue that such analyses are important
in advancing the discourse to one that includes economic
considerations and may offer avenues for more transparency in
decision-making.
Input—Output Analysis
In what follows, we use economic multipliers to examine the
effect that changes in quota allocations to Nunatsiavut may have
for the rest of the economy at a local and provincial and national
level. In the decision-making process for quota allocations, DFO
does not formally consider the overall economic impacts of the
fishing industry which are driven by direct, indirect, and induced
effects. We argue that, despite the limitations of the approach
in capturing net benefits, for the purposes of transparency an
analysis that encompasses the impacts to the economy needs to
be factored into decisions for quota allocations.
In recognition of the “downstream effects” of fisheries to
other sectors in the economy, fisheries economists have used
different methods to capture the full picture of the sector’s
economic impacts (Dyck and Sumaila, 2010). Examples of
these methods include input-output models, fishery economic
assessment models, social accounting matrices and computable
general equilibrium models (see Loveridge, 2004; Seung and
Waters, 2006 for a review of such methods and their suitability
for different purposes). Input-output (I-O) models are among the
most-commonly used approaches since they are straightforward
and easy to compute and communicate to policy-makers and
stakeholders (Hoagland et al., 2015). Their application ranges
widely; they have been used to illustrate the outcome of marginal
changes for example in the value of a fleet’s output to the total
economic impacts as well as at much larger scales to capture the
impact of unreported catches and illicit seafood trade at national
and global scales (Sumaila et al., 2020).
Following the many examples in the literature supporting
the use of I-O models to illustrate the outcome of marginal
changes (Leung and Pooley, 2001; Dyck and Sumaila, 2010),
we have chosen to use an I-O approach to show the effects
of an increase in the turbot and shrimp quota allocation to
the NG for the broader economy. Note though that from a
welfare economics perspective I-O models come with several
limitations, and economists have generally advised against using
them to make allocation decisions. Their major limitation is
that they do not capture consumer and producer surplus5 as
they represent transfer payments, essentially referring to financial
transactions. Therefore they cannot provide an estimate for net
benefits or assess changes in net economic value (Hoagland
et al., 2005). Income impacts have been used as a proxy
for surplus but may provide an overestimate of consumer or
producer value. Additionally, they do not encompass economic
efficiency considerations such as minimizing costs of production
or optimally allocating the resource (Edwards, 1990; Kirkley et al.,
2000). However, despite all their limitations they provide a useful
framework to understand the linkages of an economic sector to
the rest of the economy as well as to assess how management may
affect economic activity.
Economic multipliers are commonly used to illustrate the
many linkages of the fish production industry. The multipliers
are a factor by which one can multiply the value of final demand
for the output of the fishing (or any other economic) activity to
illustrate how it contributes to total economic output. Using these
multipliers is important in order to be able to capture not only
the direct impacts of the fishing activity, which national accounts
report, but also the indirect and induced impacts, which if left
aside may understate the contribution of the fishing industry to
the economy (Dyck and Sumaila, 2010).
Direct impacts include the production of fisheries (landed
value), income, employment, taxes, and expenditure associated to
operations of harvesting and processing (employees, contractors,
service providers, etc.). Indirect impacts arise from the changes in
all the aforementioned categories that occur in backward linked
industries (e.g., suppliers to the processing industry). Induced
impacts measure the changes in household demand, or the value
of production induced by a change in household income (for
example increased expenditure due to increased wages). These
households are linked to the fishing industry either directly
(through employment in the harvesting or processing sector)
or indirectly (by backward linked industries to harvesting or
processing), so the changes in household income are generated
from the direct or indirect impacts described earlier (see also
Statistics Canada, 2005 for a more detailed overview of the logic
behind the I-O structure of the Canadian economy).
Using estimates provided by ATN (2018) for the value of the
fisheries sector in Nunatsiavut in 2017, we obtain multipliers
for the Nunatsiavut region and estimate the economic impact
of current and recommended allocations to the NG for turbot
and northern shrimp. Since the primary data and the model for
the value components and impact estimates in ATN (2018) were
5Surpluses may include other ocean uses such as recreation, subsistence, marine
transportation or non-use values such as biodiversity protection. For a full
picture of their economic value one would need to estimate their net present
value (Hoagland et al., 2005). This becomes particularly relevant in Nunatsiavut
where the value of fisheries encompass food security and sovereignty, cultural
connections, social conditions attached to employment and many other, not easy
to capture intangible values (Bennett et al., 2018; Kourantidou et al., 2020).
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TABLE 1 | Current and advised allocations (in t) and Direct value (in $ CAD) of
sales for current and advised turbot (2+3KLMNO) and shrimp allocations (SFA 4,
5) to the Nunatsiavut Government (NG).
Allocations (t) Direct value from sales ($)
Allocation status TURBOT SHRIMP TURBOT SHRIMP
NG current 202 3,940 825,312 14,505,827
NG advised (I) 650 4,549 2,651,056 16,748,307
NG advised (II) 347 1,416,696
not available to the authors, the results should be interpreted
with care. We therefore suggest that this shall be seen as an
academic exercise that may offer insights into new considerations
that need to factor in allocation decisions, rather than a
prescriptive analysis.
To get a comparative perspective with the Newfoundland
and Labrador province, we also estimate the economic impact
for the whole province considering the scenarios of current
and recommended by the TJFB shrimp and turbot quotas.
We use the within-province multiplier for fishing, hunting and
trapping (Statistics Canada, 2020, BS114), following the logic
in Teh and Sumaila (2019). As opposed to Teh and Sumaila
(2019) though who use the simple multiplier, we use the total
multiplier that includes all 3 multipliers, the direct, indirect and
induced. Statistics Canada does not provide estimates for the
within—province multipliers Type I and Type II. Additionally,
we focus on only four components of the economic impact for
which the within province multipliers available from Statistics
Canada match those available for Nunatsiavut (ATN, 2018).
These economic impact components include sales, labor income,
GDP at market prices and imports.
We estimate the Nunatsiavut multipliers as the fraction of the
sum of direct, indirect and induced impacts in Nunatsiavut to
total impacts in Canada. For estimating the direct value from
sales of turbot and shrimp fisheries, we assume a price of $1.85/lb
for turbot (2019 average price) and $1.67/lb for shrimp (2019
average price across all seasons, FFAW, 2019). Table 1 shows in
the first two columns the NG’s current allocations in tons for
turbot (2019) in 2+3KLMNO and shrimp (2018/2019) in SFAs
4 and 5, along with the increased allocations that the TJFB has
been advising for in the past 2 years, NG advised (I) and NG
advised (II). In choosing to use for the purposes of this exercise,
the TJFB’s lines of recommendation for increased allocations to
the NG, we do not consider capacity limitations of the locally
available fleet and assume that either these have been factored in
the TJFB’s recommendations or that they can be overcome (e.g.,
through vessel leases or other transferability mechanisms that
allow capturing fishery rents). The last two columns then show
the corresponding value for turbot and shrimp under the current
allocation and the two scenarios of allocations that the TJFB has
been recently advising for.
We further assume that the value of turbot and shrimp
account for 6.83 and 70.78% of the total fisheries value in
Nunatsiavut, respectively (ATN, 2018) and that the same shares
apply to the value that these fisheries generate for household
income, GDP and imports. Figure 3 shows, for each allocation
scenario, the four-component economic impact that allocations
to the NG in the turbot and northern shrimp fisheries generate,
along with the regional impact for the province of Newfoundland
and Labrador (NFL).
This exercise illustrates that the economic impact from
changes in allocations goes beyond just the direct value generated
from fisheries and encompasses a number of other components
which may factor into decision-making. Specifically, decisions
should be made based on the regulators’ goals which may have
to do for example with boosting household income regionally or
increasing employment, revenues from provincial or federal taxes
etc. In this exercise, we have not included the economic impact
from employment insurance (EI) benefits generated from the
fisheries, but given the seasonality of these fisheries and the heavy
reliance on EI benefits in the region, this merits consideration as
well. Understanding the regional economic impacts of fisheries
production is also important when decisions are made for
allocations to stakeholders from different regions. Additionally,
in trying to administer requests from different stakeholder groups
for changes in allocations of multiple fisheries, considering
the economic impact of each fishery separately may prove
useful in adjusting these allocations to achieve the desired
socioeconomic goals.
Inequality Aversion
As discussed earlier, the AI is a very commonly used inequality
indicator that accounts for society’s aversion to inequality.
It can be used for better understanding the implications
for socioeconomic welfare from alternative policy options. It
captures the overall welfare loss to society resulting from an
unequal distribution. Typically, it is used to assess economic
impacts of policies across groups with different incomes. The
metric depends on the degree to which society is averse to
inequality, which is reflected through a weighting parameter, ε,
known as the inequality aversion parameter. Higher values of
ε indicate larger social utility or peoples’ willingness to accept
smaller incomes in exchange for a more equal distribution
(Afonso et al., 2015). An increasing ε, makes the index more
sensitive to changes at the lower end of the income distribution
while a declining ε makes it more sensitive to changes in the upper
end of the distribution.
In this case, we are agnostic about the distribution of income
among fishers. For the purposes of this exercise and in the absence
of better information, we will be using the income generated
from each stakeholder group to which turbot are allocated.
Using a price of 1.85$/lb and converting the allocations to each
group (Table 1) into lbs, we find the income generated for each
stakeholder for turbot in 2+3KLMNO. Note that, in order to get
a more holistic perspective for both areas 2+3K and 3LMNO, we
have now included, in our estimates for area 3LMNO the groups
of Offshore Enterprise Allocation (O-EA) holders (>100′) and
Scandinavian Long Liners (>100′).
A moderate inequality aversion, ε = 0.5, yields Atkinson
values 0.376 for turbot in 2+3KLMNO. This implies that 37.6%
of total income could be “sacrificed” in order to have equal
incomes or, better put, it is the fraction of income that could
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FIGURE 3 | Economic Impact of Nunatsiavut fisheries (NG), including impacts for the Newfoundland province (NFL) under 3 status of Allocations: (1) Current (C), (2)
Advised-I (A-I), and (3) Advised II (A-II) Note that the magnitude of sales in this graph is likely an underestimate (18–19%) which results in a difference in the share of
sales in the total economic impact of about 3–4%. The discrepancies in shares are due to differences in the price of shrimp used to derive impacts on labor income,
GDP at market prices and imports which were estimated for 2017, using 2016 prices (ATN, 2018). In this example, we have used 2019 prices for sales to reflect the
value of current and recently recommended allocations but have used estimates for labor income, GDP and imports provided in ATN (2018).
be sacrificed without reducing social welfare if income were
equally distributed. Alternatively, 62.4% of the present income
would be required to realize the same social welfare if it were
equally distributed.
We further examine four allocation scenarios for the turbot
fishery to illustrate the shifts in the Atkinson inequality metric.
In scenario B-I the NG is getting access to, the long-now
recommended, 650 t as a transfer from either the fixed gear < 65′
sector (fg < 65′) or the O-EA holders. These two options are
the only transfers across sectors that ensure all current allocation
holders continue to access the fishery. In scenario B-II the TAC
increases by 405 t (2019–2020 increase, TJFB, 2019), and the
increase is distributed uniformly across stakeholders so that each
one of them gets a share based on the percent of turbot share
they already hold. In scenario B-III, the 405 t TAC increase is
allocated exclusively to the three more disadvantaged groups (mg
65′–100′, mg <65′ and NG) based on their predetermined shares.
Last, in scenario B-IV, the TAC increase of 450 t is allocated
exclusively to the NG.
We then estimate, in Table 2, the outcomes for varying
degrees of inequality aversion, from medium to strong aversion
(ε = 0.5, 1, 1.5, and 2). Note that for an Atkinson value of zero
(At = 0), either outcomes need to be perfectly evenly distributed
or ε needs to equal zero. When ε equals zero, this implies that
society is indifferent between transfers between any two entities
(Maguire and Sheriff, 2011) or that society gains no utility at all
by complete redistribution of income or resources, which results
in a zero AI. For an increasingly unequal distribution or as ε
approaches infinity (ε→∞), meaning that society places more
weights on transfer to entities with lower income or resources, the
Atkinson value approaches 1 (At→ 1). This means that complete
redistribution of income or resources leads to infinite social utility
gained. Therefore, under certain conditions of society’s inequality
aversion (ε), lower values of At point at a more equal distribution
compared to higher values. Note that since the choice of ε is
normative, it is a common practice to calculate AIs for several
ε values to determine how sensitive outcomes are to the choice of
inequality aversion.
In a societal setting with weak inequality aversion (e.g.,
ε = 0.25), in order to fulfill the NG’s request for increased
quota (650 t) and under equal distribution considerations, the
preferred allocation scenario among those examined, would be
to transfer quotas from the fixed gear < 65′ fleet directly to the
NG. As society’s inequality aversion increases though, the fleet
sector from which the transfer happens becomes less important
(ε = 1, 1.5, 2). Alternatively, in the existence of a TAC increase
(405 t), the additional quota could be distributed across the
three most disadvantaged stakeholder groups according to their
pre-determined shares (Scenario B-III, 3.36% for mg 65′–100′,
32.66% for mg < 65′ and 63.98% for the NG). These two policies
yield the exact same outcome in terms of income inequality,
under conditions of weak inequality aversion in society (Table 2,
At = 0.157). As society’s aversion to inequality increases, the
allocation in scenario B-III becomes more favorable. The least
favorable scenario, in the case of a TAC increase, is to distribute
the additional quota based on the pre-determined share of all
stakeholders/allocation holders (scenario B-II). This holds for all
degrees of inequality aversion and as expected, becomes even less
favorable as society’s inequality aversion increases.
Had information been available on the income distribution
of fishers, it would have been possible to compare the outcomes
for scenarios of allocations using different inequality aversion
weights. In the absence of this information we use instead for
the purposes of this exercise, household incomes in Canada.
Table 3 shows in the first column the income quintiles for
the household income in Canada (2016) along with Atkinson
index values for varying degrees of inequality aversion. The
main assumption behind this metric is that marginal utility of
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TABLE 2 | Atkinson index (At ) estimates for different allocation scenarios under varying aversion to inequality.
Allocation scenarios Inequality aversion weights
ε = 0.25 ε = 0.5 ε = 1 ε = 1.5 ε = 2
B-I Transfer across sectors (NG quota: 650 t) From fg < 65′ 0.157 0.319 0.655 0.843 0.928












To all stakeholders 0.191 0.376 0.684 0.857 0.930
on pre-determined %
B-III To 1) mg 65′–100′,
2) mg < 65′, 3) NG
0.157 0.309 0.496 0.760 0.862
B-IV Exclusive distribution To NG 0.168 0.337 0.597 0.853 0.932
income is diminishing across groups with increasing median
income (Farrow, 2011; Hoagland et al., 2015). Marginal utility for
income group i can be expressed as U ′i = λY
−ε
i where yi is some
measure of group income and λ a constant. Inequality can then
be expressed relative to the marginal utility of median income for






λ ȳ−ε = (
ȳ
yi )
ε , so that welfare gains or
losses to low income groups are weighted more heavily relative to
the median and the opposite holds for high income groups.
As an example, consider that fishers in one of the stakeholder
categories to which DFO allocates the turbot quota belongs
to the lowest quintile while the rest of the stakeholder groups
are average income holders. In this example, we will be
assuming that those fishing under the NG license are the
ones in the lowest income quintile. The most recent census
information, available by Statistics Canada for 2015, does not
provide sufficient evidence that the median household total
income in Nunatsiavut communities is among the lowest in the
Newfoundland and Labrador province. However, a closer look
at Census Division No. 11 (Statistics Canada, 2017, 2019b) and
the literature describing poverty and vulnerability conditions
in the region (Duhaime and Édouard, 2015; Government of
Canada, 2020) suggests that this may be an assumption with
empirical merit6.
Figure 4 shows, what the local and total welfare (in this
exercise in terms of value produced from fisheries) would look
like in the hypothetical case where the turbot fishers under NG’s
communal license are in the lowest income quintile with all other
fishers in the third income quintile.
The ratio of weights for the lowest quintile compared to the
highest quintile increases from 1:1 when ε = 0, to 1.75 when
ε = 0.25, to 9 when ε = 1 and may reach up to 130 when ε = 2, the
most “extreme” level of inequality aversion in this example. This
type of analysis brings to surface the effects of allocations which
are distributionally weighted. Decisions on ways of allocating an
6In 2015, the median total income of households in Division No. 11 was $70,315
($67,272 in the province) with 21.1% of the population in low income (15.4% in
the province) (Statistics Canada, 2017, 2019b). See also low income in Aboriginal
Population Profile for census Division No. 11 (Statistics Canada, 2019a), including
low-income measure and low-income cut-offs after tax. Previous studies have also
indicated that the poverty rate in Nunatsiavut is 4–5 times higher than the one
suggested by Statistics Canada (24.4–24.7%, as opposed to 5.4%) (Duhaime and
Édouard, 2015; Statistics Canada, 2017).
increase in TAC, would then need to factor in the magnitude of
distributional weights.
Total welfare is higher when the increase in TAC is
allocated exclusively to the NG compared to distributing
it across all stakeholders according to their predetermined
shares in the fishery. Notice though that with increasing
inequality aversion, the difference between the two allocation
mechanisms becomes larger.
While this example is again an academic exercise rather than
an actual measure of the effects of the existing inequality in the
allocation mechanism, it becomes clear why a sensitivity analysis
to the assumption of equal marginal utility of income (ε = 0) is
important (Farrow, 2011) or in other words why an unweighted
analysis may be misguiding allocation policies.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have addressed equity concerns for the
NG’s access to commercial fisheries, suggesting that fisheries
management authorities should consider using equity tools in
their allocation decisions if they are to meet their commitments in
federal and international mandates. Depending on the definition
taken for equity and the scope within which it is considered, a
variety of such tools are available to decision-makers. We discuss
a few of the most prominent ones in the fisheries literature and
focus on selected approaches that fit the NG’s concerns and
for which the data available to us allow for such an exercise.
We acknowledge that, given data limitations, our estimates of
economic impacts and scenarios for the effects of shifts in
allocations were developed as an academic exercise and should
be seen through this lens. Nevertheless, we strongly recommend
moving the tools and approaches discussed in this paper into
the actual decision-making framework. Making the use of such
tools more transparent can also help build trust in federal
authorities, increase understanding of the reasoning behind
allocation decisions and also possibly reduce future conflicts
among stakeholders in the fisheries. This may allow regional
bodies, such as the NG, to develop policies supporting their
communities in fully capturing the benefits from their adjacent
fisheries and better understanding the long-term economic
benefits of additional investments in the sector.
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TABLE 3 | Household Income quintilesa (in $ CAD) (2016) (Lapointe, 2019) and Atkinson value estimates for varying inequality aversion weights.
Household income by quintiles Inequality aversion weights
ε = 0 ε = 0.25 ε = 0.5 ε = 1 ε = 1.5 ε = 2
1 $19,691 1 1.4 1.9 3.6 6.9 13
2 $44,554 1 1.1 1.3 1.6 2.0 2.5
3 $71,043 1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
4 $106,871 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.4
5 $201,390 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.1
aAverage household income (adjusted for purchasing power parities) in each interval (see more details in Lapointe, 2019; Statistics Canada, 2018).
FIGURE 4 | Local welfare (LW), in lines, and Total welfare (TW), in columns, produced from the turbot 2+3KLMNO fishery under varying inequality aversion weights
for scenarios B-II (in green, distribution of TAC increase to all stakeholders) and B-IV (in blue, distribution of TAC increase to the NG only).
Our focus is limited to the turbot and northern shrimp
stocks which are both adjacent to LISA but to which the NG
enjoys limited access to. It is important though to recognize
the interdependencies between all four commercial fisheries in
Nunatsiavut. Access to the Arctic char and snow crab fisheries
may be exclusive to Nunatsiavut but are influenced in direct and
indirect ways by how well the turbot and shrimp fisheries fare.
Examples of direct ways include contributions to the Commercial
Fisheries Fund which has the broader scope of strengthening
Nunatsiavut’s fishing sector. The Arctic char fishery, which ranks
high in the priorities of Labrador Inuit primarily for cultural
reasons, suffers from insufficient scientific funding and attention
from DFO, which has led to significant knowledge gaps on the
stocks and their spatial distribution, especially after the early
1990s. Increased access to turbot and shrimp, and therefore
profitability, subject to market conditions, may allow for more
investments in research on behalf of the NG, beyond what DFO is
willing to invest. More resources from increased access to turbot
and shrimp may also allow for investments in better monitoring
opportunities for all fisheries in Northern Labrador where the
availability of observers is very limited. Additionally, it may
contribute to the development of fleet capacity locally not only
for those two fisheries but also for the snow crab fishery for which
Nunatsiavut designates also go into leasing vessel arrangements
with harvesters elsewhere. It is important to be mindful though
that perspectives within Labrador Inuit communities differ, with
some designates for example not seeing vessel-ownership as
necessary because the current arrangements (e.g., for shrimp)
allow them to use their time for other traditionally and culturally
important activities (Foley et al., 2019). However local vessel
ownership is generally seen as contributing positively to building
local capacity and gaining sovereignty over adjacent fisheries.
These are just a few examples of direct and indirect ways in which
increased access may be seen as a path to increased sovereignty
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providing the ability to address locally important priorities and
promoting the establishment of institutions that may advance
fisheries locally.
Despite the LILCA’s provisions for local control and
governance of resources and the recognition of these provisions
in the mandates of the Federal Government’s resource
management frameworks, in many instances there has been
a failure in realizing this potential. Canada retains the power
to control access, determine access rules, and allocate property
rights to different stakeholders, because decisions are subject to
Ministerial Discretion. Despite consultations with stakeholder
groups, which are institutionalized in fishery management plans,
the decision-making process on allocations is often unclear and
based on non-transparent considerations. That is similar to
several reported cases in the literature where quota distribution
is determined based on the economic and political power that
different fleet sectors may wield (Gray et al., 2011).
Additionally, DFO’s Policy and Economic Analysis Division
does not formally consider the effects that quota cuts, changes
in management or changes in allocations may have for fisheries
dependent communities, such as those of Nunatsiavut that we
have examined in this paper. Recent amendments to the Fisheries
Act, however, do allow the Minister to incorporate socioeconomic
implications as well as IK in decision-making. In order for the
Minister to do so, however, this information needs to be collected,
calculated, or provided. In addition to the Fisheries Act, several
other federal government mandates put emphasis on inclusion of
IK for guiding and informing science and management. These
mandates cover both commercial and subsistence harvesting
of marine resources, and, while there are stronger voices and
literature that support the need to include and prioritize IK for
subsistence harvest (Kourantidou et al., 2020), such is not the
case for commercial fisheries. This is true despite strong evidence
that ignoring IK can be detrimental for the conservation of stocks
[e.g., see Milich (1999) for an example of undervaluation of IK
in the Newfoundland (François) cod fishery]. The cod fishery
collapse in Newfoundland and Labrador has also undermined
trust on behalf of fishers in top-down management approaches
given past failures to predict stocks (Schott, 2004). Past colonial
practices in resource governance in Nunatsiavut and all across
Inuit Nunangat (Felt et al., 2012; Keenan et al., 2018; Kourantidou
et al., 2020) perpetuate mistrust and create barriers to fruitful
partnerships between local users and resource managers which
may come at the cost of mismanaging the fishery.
The role of co-management boards in confronting
such colonial legacies by ensuring the uptake of IK and
accommodating local user perspectives in decision-making is
critical for building trust and reconciling contrasting views on
fisheries management. Co-management also helps promote a
long-term view to management, which is essential to maintaining
healthy fish stocks and distributing rents in an equitable manner.
In such decentralized approaches to fisheries governance, the
role of provincial governments as part of co-management is
seen as key, since they can help provide input into regional
development issues and also education and communication
between fishers, communities and scientists (Schott, 2004). Their
involvement is seen as critical for income redistribution and
specifically to ensure that wealth is evenly distributed. Schott
(2004) warns though that providing them with more power could
potentially be detrimental and suggests instead shifting authority
and responsibility to resource users, because their behavior is
influenced by management rules and institutions and having
them cooperate is particularly important.
Co-management in Nunatsiavut is designed to involve the
participation of local, provincial and federal government actors.
The TJFB actively prioritizes the inclusion of local resource
users in the co-management process as well as in its annual
recommendations to the federal Minister. A lack of transparency
though in the decision-making process at the ministerial level
limits the potential of the co-management process. Additionally,
as we have argued in this paper, the lack of transparency regarding
economic and equity considerations to support decisions on
access and allocation decisions allows for misinterpretations
about what may factor into decision-making in practice.
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